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ABSTRACT
A protection model is presented for a multi-user dataflow
computing system which is incorporated into its functional
high-level language. The model is based on tags attached as
'seals' to values exchanged among processes to prevent
leaking of information. A tag attached to a value, as a
'seal' does not prevent that value from being propagated to
any place within the system; rather, it guarantees that the
value cannot leave the system unless a matching tag is
presented. Any function applied to sealed values will
produce results that carry the union of all seals carried by
the argument values. Thus, it is also guaranteed that no
information derived from a sealed value will be able to
leave the system unless it is explicitly unsealed.
The functioning of the system is demonstrated by giving
solutions to well known protection problems, for example
from the area of proprietary services, such as the
'Selective Confinement Problem' and the 'Trojan Horse
Problem.'
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Introduction Objectives
In recent years the need for better and less restrictive
protection mechanisms has emerged. A variety of advanced
protection systems have been proposed but the drawback most
common in Such systems is their complexity in both use and
understanding. In addition, many well known protection
problems still have no satisfactory solution in these
systems. The goal of this paper is to present a protection
mechanism that is easily understood by the (user)
programmer, yet powerful enough to allow the solution of a
large variety of protection problems. This mechanism is
defined by a very small set of primitive operations that may
be incorporated as part of a functional high—level language.
Thus the implementation and enforcement, of protection
policies do not require that the user leave the domain of
the language in which his programs are written.
In the sequel, we give a description and a possible
implementation of the proposed mechanism in the context of a
dataflow system. We will demonstrate that despite the
conceptual simplicity of the system we are able to give
satisfactory solutions to well known protection problems,
for example from the area of proprietary services, such as
the 'Selective Confinement Problem' /Lam73, DeGr74/ and the
'Trbjan Horse Problem' /Sch72/.
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2. An Intuitive Description ijf. the Model
We consider a computing system to be a collection of
independent processes, each of which is in possession of a
number of objects, where an object may be any piece of data.
We will use the terms 'object' and 'value* as synonyms since
in dataflow any object is treated as a value. Processes
communicate by sending messages where a message is a copy of
some value; that is, no sharing of objects among processes
is allowed.*
All processes are enclosed within a single 'sphere'
representing the boundary ^ the system. The users of the
system are standing outside the sphere and may communicate
with its interior only via special windows in the sphere's
wall called informati on disclosure interfaces (IDIs) . Data
may enter and leave the system only via an IDI.
3. A Functional view Protection
Our model is concerned with controlling information
dissemination. We provide machanisms to allow any value to
be protected by attaching to it a unique tag referred to as
a .aeaJL. A seal will prevent that value (and any information
derived from it) from leaving the system (the sphere).
Seals may be used in only well defined ways which prevent
*In dataflow these requirements are always satisfied. Some
operating systems also provide an equivalent view of inter
process communication, in which case the results of this
paper are.applicable.
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user processes from forging or otherwise compromising the
seals of other processes as will be discussed in Section
4.3.
Conceptually, any number of seals may be attached to a value
V (possibly by different proceges). A function f performed
on the value v produces a new value v' as a result. We
require that v' inherit all seals carried by the value v.
In case more than one input value is required by the
function, the resulting value v' must inherit the union of
all seals carried by the input values. This may be
expressed as follows:
v'<- f(vl, v2, ..., vn)
seals(v') <- seals(vl) U seals(v2) U ... U seals(vn)
where vl,v2, ..., vn are the input values to f and seals(vi)
is the set of seals carried by the value vi.
Thus ^ stage Ot the comoutati on protects on
^ value X may ke. expressed as. the set of seals seal (vV
computed ilia union if. all seal s^ia carried ky: the
input values.
The purpose of attaching seals to a value is to prevent
leaking of information contained in that value. As stated
above, any data may leave the system only via one of the
windows (IDIs) in the sphere. At the point of output the
II
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protection of a value is examined. Only values which have
an .empty set of seals will be allowed to pass the IDI and
reach the "outside world". Since no function applied to a
sealed value v can produce a result which is less protected
than V itself, it is guaranteed that no leaking of
information derived from v can take place, regardless of the
functions used.
The basic philosophy of our approach may then be summarized
as follows;
A piece oL data potentially may: propagate to. any place
within the systenii When protected with 3. seal it is.
guaranteed that this data and any information derived
it. will not ha able to leave the system unless the
seal is. removed.
Since our approach departs significantly from those taken in
other systems where data is prevented from propagating
unless certain access or capability conditions are met, the
following discussion is intended to further explain our
point of view.
In most existing systems known to the author no distinction
is made between the (human) user and the process running
under his command. Implicit in such systems is the notion
that the information accessible to a user's process is
Page 7
automatically available to that user. Consequently, the
secrecy of information must be. considered compromised as
soon as it reaches an unauthorized user's process. We argue
that this condition is unnecessarily restrictive. Imagine a
sealed box containing secret information. If this box
cannot be opened by a 'spy' no disclosure of information
will take place even if the spy is actually in possession of
the box. Similarly, in a computing facility it is not
really the process that must be prevented from illegally
accessing sensitive information, but rather the user running
that process.
A process which posseses secret informati on but which
±5. unable. JlQ reveal that informati on consti tntPH no
danger with respect te protection.
To further illustrate the basic philosophy of our approach
we would like to contrast our system with a capability based
system such as HYDRA /CoJe75/. In HYDRA'a process can make
use of an object (e.g. read and output a file) if the
process is in possession of a capability for that object. A
capability consists of a pointer to the object and a set of
rights (e.g. a read right) which determines those
operations the holder of the capability may perform on the
object.
In order for a process to make use of ah object (e.g. a
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file) in our system, the process must necessarily be in
possession of that object itself, and in case this object is
carrying a set of seals the process must also be in
possession of all the seals included in the set. Only then
is the process able to unseal and thus disclose the object
outside the sphere.
4. Implementation OL the Model in n Dataflow System
Even though our model is independent of any particular
language or machine architecture it was especially developed
for functional systems such as dataflow /ArGoPlTB, Den73/.
We will attempt to justify our- approach by giving solutions
to several well known protection problems in Section 5.
4.1 Pasio Dataflow Principles
A primary motivation for studying dataflow is the advent of
LSI technology which makes feasible the construction of a
general-purpose computer comprising hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of asynchronously operating processors /GoTh79/.
The semantics of a dataflow program are such that it is
implicitly partitioned into small tasks called act-i vi fi ps
that may be executed asynchronously by independent
processors. In this way many procesors may cooperate in
completing the overall' computation. In the dataflow system
developed at the University of California, Irvine, programs
. Page 9
are written only in the high level language Id (for Xrvine
dataflow).An Id program is compiled into a corresponding
program in the base language -- a directed graph consisting
of actors" (operators) interconnected by lines that transport
values on tokens. For example, Fig. 1 is an expression in
Id and Fig. .2 is its compiled form. The execution of every
actor is completely data-driven which means that execution
is carried out when and only when all operands needed by
that actor have arrived. The resulting output values are
then sent to other actors which expect those values as
inputs. Thus the multiply actor in Fig. 2 will produce the
result x*c and send it on a token to the plus actor after
having received both the operand x produced by the subtract
actor and the operand c (an input to the program).
In addition to the asynchronous, data-driven, style of
execution, dataflow is conceptually memoryless. All values
are carried by tokens exchanged between actors. Thus all
calculations are on values rather than on the contents of
addressable memory cells. This implies that no sharing of
data is possible since every actor gets a separate copy of
each input value. The absence of memory implies also that
it is not meaningful to talk about 'accessing' data. All
information must be supplied to actors and collections of
actors (e.g. expressions, procedures, programs) explicitly
in the form of arguments. These arguments propagate through
the graph constituting the program and the final resulting
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values are returned to the caller of the program. This
principle is crucial to the protection system described
here: No program can ever gain access to (e.g. steal or
destroy) any information which is not explicitly passed to
it by the caller as an argument. The possibility of a
program gaining access to data private to the caller of the
program is referred to as the Trojan Horse problem, and in
our system it is immediately solved by the fundamental
principles of dataflow. This is discussed in further detail
in Section 5.1.
4.2 Dataflow Processes
Dataflow managers were introduced into Id /ArGoP178/ to
provide the non-determinism necessary for managing resources
such as airline reservation databases, etc.. An instance of
a manager is a dataflow program (graph) enclosed between an
gntry and an exit actor (Fig. 3). The entry actor receives
^11 arguments (e.g. argl, arg2) sent to that manager,
possibly from different users, and forms a stream of tokens
directed into the managers body. The body of a manager may
be any dataflow expression with a stream, argument and a
stream result. In Fig. 3 we have presumed the body to be a
loop which recomputes an 'internal state' on each iteration
which occurs essentially upon the arrival of each token in
the input stream. By making the 'internal state' on each
iteration a function of its previous value and the value of
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the token just obtained from the input stream, the effect of
an internal memory is 'artificially' achieved. In this
manner the output of a manager may be made to depend on the
history of previous inputs. The stream of result tokens
(e.g. resl, res2) is then sent to the exit actor which
returns the individual tokens comprising the output stream
to the corresponding callers.
In order to be able to call a particular manager, the user
must be in possession of a reference m to the instance of
the manager. In Id a call to the manager m is denoted as:
resl <- use(m,argl)
The value m refers to the desired manager instance and is
supplied together with the argument value argl to the
primitive actor use. This primitive sends the value argl to
the entry of the manager instance and receives the value
resl returned from the manager's exit as the result of its
processing argument argl. (Similarly for the other use of m
in Fig. 3).
We define a process to be an instance of a manager. The
only way for processes to communicate is by explicitly
calling one another through the use primitive. Thus
information is always passed explicitly in the form of
arguments and results; information is never passed by
granting 'access' to information, (e.g. a portion of
memory) as is the case in conventional systems.
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Although the above description is in. terms of dataflow, it
of course holds for any system which communicates only
through copied messages. Thus the system described here
might be used on a conventional system at the level of
processes, where tokens are the messages in an inter-process
communication facility.
4.3 Implementation Protection Mechanisms
All processes in the system capable of holding and
exchanging information are implemented as dataflow managers.
The information to be exchanged may be of any type, e.g.
integers, reals, strings, structured values, procedure
definitions, etc. The following extensions are introduced
in order to implement the protection mechanisms described
earlier.
a) A special facility called the seal generator is the
only facility capable of creating values of type seal.
The fact that seals are of a distinct data type is used
to eliminate the possibility of (accidentally or
intentionally) forging a seal: once created a seal may
never be modified, nor may a new value of type seal be
produced other than by the seal generator.
b) Every value v carries with it a (possibly empty) set
of seals. We denote this as v{sl,s2,..,,sn}.
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c) Two primitive operations are defined for attaching
seals to and detaching seals from values:
1) v' <- ££al(v,s)
The value v' is a copy of v, and in addition the
seal s is included in the set of seals of v' .
2) v',f <- unsealfVfS^
In case the seal s is an element of the set of
seals carried by v then the value v' is a copy of
V with the seal s removed and the value f (serving
as a flag) is set to true. In case s is not
carried by v as a seal then v' is an exact copy of
V and f has the value false. Thus the value of f
indicates whether the seal s was carried by v.
d) A primitive operation test-seal(v) is defined on any
value V. This primitive may be used by the programmer
to detect whether a value is protected by at least one
seal. If this is the case the boolean value true is
returned, otherwise the value false is returned.
e) The result of any function f in the system, other
than unsealf must carry the set union of all seals
carried by the individual values involved in the
computation. An example of a primitive function f is
shown in Fig. 4 where the set of seals {sl,s2,s3}
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carried by the result z is the union of the sets
{sl,s2} and {sl,s3} carried by the inputs x and y,
respectively.
f) As described in Section 1, communication between a
user standing outside the system sphere and the
processes inside is possible only via an information
disclosure interface (IDI). Each IDI is a special
process which is validated by the administrator of the
system (i.e. it is trusted). A system properly
configured would ensure that any piece of data sent to
a user terminal must move via an IDI. Each IDI employs
the primitive test-seal defined above to, test the
received data. If that data is unsealed the IDI passes
it through the window to the outside. If a seal is
detected the data is destroyed and an error message is
returned to the process attempting to use the IDI.
Thus no sealed value is able to escape from the system.
It is important to realize that the IDIs must be
physically, interposed between any sending process
inside the sphere and a receiving terminal outside the
sphere. IClilia the IDia define the boundary qL the
system - ilie sphere.
In the sequel we will demonstrate the use of the
protection system as defined in a) through f) by
applying it to problems associated with providing
proprietary services.
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5. Application OL iiie. Protection System
5.1 Prcpcietary services
Most users of a computer system have the need or desire to
build on the work of others by utilizing programs and
systems provided by other programmers. We will refer to
such programs as proprietary services. We argue that using
a proprietary service may also be viewed (and implemented)
as interprocess communication: if the user and the service
are two separate processes then the user is sending a
package of information (e.g. the arguments) to the service
which produces a new package of information (the results)
that is then sent back to the user. Thus the user of a
service is considered as both the sender and the receiver of
an information package which is being passed through and
modified by an intermediate process - the service. .Several
important protection problems must be solved in order to
satisfy the needs of the lessors (owners, providers) and the
lessees (users) of such services. The lessee's major
concerns are the following:
a) The service must not be able to steal or destroy
information which the lessee did not explicitly supply
to the service. Each such service is employed by
sending it the necessary arguments via the use
primitive described in section 4.2. Since this is the
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only way a process can receive information it is
guaranteed that a service cannot obtain or destroy
information belonging to the lessee or some other
process unless that information was explicitly supplied
as an argument. Thus the fundamental principles of
dataflow solve this problem, referred to as the Trojan
Horse Problem,
b) The service must not be able to disclose sensitive
information suplied to it by the lessee, but it should
be allowed to disclose,non-sensitive information, for
example, for the purposes of billing. The following
section (5.2) presents a solution to this problem,
usually referred to as the Selective Confinement
Problem.
On the other hand, the lessor's major concerns are the
following:
a) The lessee must not be able to destroy or steal
(copy) parts of the service. This includes not only
the code itself but also any intermediate results that
could be misused to deduce information about the
principles and methods employed by the service.
b) -Permission to use the service must not provide a way
for the lessee to steal or destroy informaton which is
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not part of the service.
In Id, in. order to employ a service only a reference to the
manager (which is the implementation of that service) need
be given to the lessee. The only operation defined on such
a reference is the use primitive that communicates the
necessary arguments and results between the lessee and the
service as was described in Section 4.2. These points imply
the solution to the above two problems a) and b).
5.2 The Selective Confinement Problem
The essence of the problem is to guarantee that a borrowed
program, e.g. a service routine, will not disclose any
sensitive information passed to it by a caller for
processing.
Assume, for example, that the lessor provides a proprietary
service called Tax which calculates the income tax for any
lessee that supplies to it the necessary information, such
as salary, deductions, address, etc.. In order to employ
the service the following call must be performed
res <- use(Tax. data)
where 'Tax' is the reference to the service process, 'data'
represents the collection of values supplied by the lessee,
and 'res' is the income tax calculated by 'Tax' based on
'data'. Since the lessee of the service may not trust the
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Tax program, he wishes to prevent certain sensitive
information (e.g. the salary) from being disclosed to other
users, including the lessor of the service. On the other
hand, the service, in additon to computing the income tax,
needs to calculate a bill for the services rendered and to
give a copy of the bill to the lessor.
In order to solve the problem the lessee is asked to
partition the data sent to the service into two parts - one
part contains sensitive information, such as the salary,
while the other part contains information not needing
protection from disclosure, e.g. the lessee's name and
address, which is required by the Tax system for the purpose
of billing. In calling the service the lessee may protect
the sensitive part of the data by attaching to it a seal
known only to the lessee. The non-sensitive part is left
unprotected. The call then has the form
sd' <- .s£^(sd,s) ;
res <- use(Tax,<sd',fd>);
where sd is the sensitive datapart, sd' is a copy of sd with
the seal s attached to it, and fd is the non-sensitive
(free) data part. (The angle brackets indicate a list of
arguments). The flow of information is shown in Fig. 5.
The service computes the result and returns it to the lessee
as the. value res. For example, a computation within the
service process might be
r <- compute_tax(sd',fd)
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where the value r will inherit the seal s from sd'. If r is
the value returned (possibly at some later point) to the
lessee as res (by the use primitive shown above) , he is able
to detach the seal s from res by
res' <- unsealfresfS)
and output the unsealed value res' - 'the income tax. On the
other hand the bill may be computed by the service using
only the non-sensitive data, as in
bill <- compute_bill(td)
If this is the case the value bill will be unsealed, and if
sent to the lessor for subsequent billing of the lessee it
may be used freely, that is, it may be output. The value r
(res) and any other values possibly derived from sd' are
sealed with the seal s. Hence, even if sent to the lessor
by the service, these values cannot be utilized since no
information disclosure interface will permit these values to
leave the system. Note that we do not prevent the service
from propagating any of the sensitive data to other
processes. This permits the service to employ yet other
services on its own behalf.
6. Conclusions
This paper presented a protection mechanism which is simple
to understand and to use, yet powerful enough to allow the
solution of a large variety of, protection problems. The
entire mechanism presented here is based on attaching and
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detaching unforgable seals to values and is controlled by
the programmer through only a few primitives. Despite its
simplicity we have been able to give solutions to problems
which cannot be solved easily in most other advanced
protection systems, e.g. the Selective Confinement
Problem.*
The price paid for the capabilities of the system is
overhead in Computation: for every primitive operation some
computation producing a new set of seals might be necessary.
However, since the computation of the new set of seals is
independent of the computation of the actual value, a
processing unit can be designed to perform both tasks in
parallel. Thus little degradation of the actual
computational performance need be introduced due to the
protection mechanism. With decreasing cost of hardware the
cost of the additional processors or processor components
would appear minimal. This argument holds especially in the
case of a dataflow machine which consists of a large number
of inexpensive processors available through LSI technology.
*Further application examples may be found in /Bic78/ where
we present solutions to problems such as the "Prison Mail
System" /AmHo77/, "Sneaky Signaling" /Lam73/, /Rot74/, and
problems related to file systems.
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